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HOLLOW TROPES:
FRESH PERSPECTIVES ON COURTS, POLITICS, AND
INEQUALITY
Tomiko Brown-Nagin*
Martha Minow, In Brown's Wake: Legacies ofAmerica's Educational Landmark
(Oxford U. Press 2010). Pp. 320. $24.95.
Paul Frymer, Black and Blue: African Americans, the Labor Movement, and the Decline
of the Democratic Party (Princeton U. Press 2007). Pp. 224. $28.95.
Julie Novkov, Racial Union: Law, Intimacy, and the White State in Alabama, 1865-1954
(U. Mich. Press 2008). Pp. 368. $28.95.
In April, 2010, the New York Times reported that President Obama had "spoken
disparagingly about liberal victories before the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1960s and the
1970s." I Obama remarked that activist, liberal judges of that era, like activist
conservative judges today, "ignored the will of Congress, ignored democratic processes,
and tried to impose judicial solutions on problems instead of letting the process work
itself through politically." 2 The President uttered these remarks against the backdrop of a
Roberts' Court campaign finance ruling that ended restrictions on corporate spending in
elections 3  a decision that Obama publicly rebuked at a State of the Union address.4
Although some commentators expressed surprise at Obama's remarks, he had expressed
a similar sentiment in a campaign book when he wrote, "[i]n our reliance on the courts to
vindicate not only our rights but also our values, progressives had lost too much faith in
democracy." 5
The sentiments of the President, a former professor of constitutional law, also
* Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Justice Thurgood Marshall Distinguished Professor of Law and Professor of
History at the University of Virginia.
1. Charlie Savage & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Says Liberal Courts May Have Overreached, N.Y.
Times Al5 (Apr. 30, 2010).
2. Id. Many commentators interpreted the President's remarks as an endorsement of "judicial restraint."
They understood Obama to imply that the precedents rendered by the "Warren and Burger courts - which
expanded criminal defendant rights, required busing to desegregate schools and declared a right to abortion - . .
were dubious." Id See also Robert Barnes, Recent High Court Cases Revive Debate on Judicial Activism,
Wash. Post A13 (May 3, 2010); Geoffrey R. Stone, President Obama and Judicial Activism, Huffington Post,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/president-obama-and-judic b_561798.html (posted May 3,
2010, 6:39 p.m. EDT). It is not clear to me that this inference is the correct one to draw.
3. Savage & Stolberg, supra n. 1 (referencing the decision in Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010)).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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happen to reflect perspectives in recent scholarship about constitutional law. This
scholarship, all written by highly regarded liberal academics, offers a skeptical
assessment of federal courts' value as problem solvers of complex social and economic
matters. The pessimistic appraisal is most clearly and most often associated with the
claim that affirmative constitutional litigation in the U.S. Supreme Court offered bleak
prospects - a "hollow hope" - of fundamental social change.6 Scholars' calls for "judicial
minimalism"7 and to take the constitution away from the courts strike a similar chord.
A trio of recent books Martha Minow's In Brown's Wake: Legacies ofAmerica's
Educational Landmark, Paul Frymer's Black and Blue: African Americans, the Labor
Movement, and the Decline of the Democratic Party, and Julie Novkov's Racial Union:
Law, Intimacy, and the White State in Alabama, 1865-1954 - brings fresh perspectives to
the study of how courts, political actors, and a range of institutions have contributed to
the nation's current mix of inequality and opportunity. Like earlier commentators, these
authors recognize that court-based change is not a reliable tool of problem solving. Yet
they also offer nuanced appraisals of how courts fit into policymaking; they emphasize
judicial competencies as much as deficiencies. These books perpetuate neither the image
of the activist judge who can transform the world through political activism, nor the
myth of the jurist who avoids politics and mechanically "applies the law." 9 Rather, these
books invite readers to ponder the complex and interactive ways in which courts,
lawmakers, and citizens move society forward, and push it back, toward an array of
political outcomes.
Martha Minow's book breathes new life into Brown v. Board of Education.10 In
Brown's Wake persuasively argues that the legacy of the landmark decision extends far
beyond race. Brown, Minow teaches us, spurred movements for equality under law and
democracy in society among a range of groups: immigrants, language minorities,
religious minorities, girls, gays, persons with disabilities, and the poor. Minow provides
a dazzling array of examples to demonstrate her thesis that Brown's democratizing
impact extended far and wide. Indeed, this sprawling work traverses the domestic sphere
and considers the global impact of the landmark case. She moves seamlessly from
considering educational equality in Mississippi, Texas, and San Francisco, to pondering
6. See Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 39-40, 74-75,
93, 155-156, 336343 (U. Chi. Press 2nd ed., 2008); compare with Michael Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil
Rights: the Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality 363-442, 463-468 (Oxford U. Press 2004).
7. See Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Harvard U.
Press 2001).
8. Mark V. Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton U. Press 2000).
9. All recent nominees to the U.S. Supreme Court have pledged fealty to some version of restrained
judging, in which judges avoid activism. During his confirmation hearing, Chief Justice Roberts famously
claimed that judges should merely "call balls and strikes" rather than impose his own policy choices and
preferred outcomes in cases. See Todd S. Purdum & Robin Toner, Roberts Pledges He'll Hear Cases With
'Open Mind', N.Y. Times Al (Sept. 12, 2005). In a similar vein, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, during her
confirmation hearings, described her judicial philosophy as "simple: fidelity to the law." See Peter Baker &
Neil A Lewis, Judge Focuses on Rule of Law at the Hearings, N.Y. Times Al (July 13, 2009) A judge's task
was not "to make law" but to "apply the law," she said. Id. Sotomayor's statements describing her approach to
judging occurred amid charges that she permitted politics and policymaking to play roles in judging; these
charges were based, in part, on an address that Sotomayor delivered in which she referenced her ethnicity and
gender (calling herself a "wise Latina").Id.
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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the same issue in South Africa, Ireland, and the Czech Republic.'
Brown has a rich legacy, but what has Brown wrought? Just the same as in the
context of race and schools, the case's legacy is mixed - even contradictory - in the many
other areas that it has touched. Practically speaking, courts, legislators, educators, and
activists have translated the principle of equality in education for which Brown stands in
a variety of ways, some of which are in tension with one another. Perspectives on what
equality requires, permits, or encourages are inextricable from normative commitments
about the thorniest social and educational policy issues of the day. The chief debate
concerns a fundamental question: whether equality contemplates integration, or permits
separation, that is, separate but equal education.12
Minow informs us that, over time, Brown's equality principle, construed in
different contexts and stretched to accommodate local needs, yielded inconsistent results.
In many cities, students learn English through immersion programs, a form of language
instruction that values the social integration of English language learners and native
speakers. But equality yielded bilingual schools catered to the cultural needs of Somali
immigrants in the Twins Cities, a Hebrew language charter school in New Jersey, and
Arabic language schools in New York City. Advocacy groups for persons with
disabilities harnessed Brown first to achieve integration, called mainstreaming in this
context, and then to gain specialized instruction in separate spaces. Critics of New
York's Harvey Milk High School for gay, lesbian, and transgendered students invoked
Brown's equality norm in a bid to shut it down. 13
Minow's discussion of the reemergence of single-sex education in American
education is highly engaging. Despite the U.S. Supreme Court's decision requiring the
historically all-male Virginia Military Institute to admit women, Minow notes, public
single-sex schools may well pass constitutional muster in the future.14 Meanwhile, under
the administration of President George W. Bush, federal law began to accommodate and
even encourage the growth of single-sex schools at the elementary and secondary
levels. 15 The number of single-sex classroom and charter schools has grown as a result.
Feminists and civil rights leaders struggle to explain whether these developments are
consistent with equality.
Minow highlights one reason for indeterminate interpretations of equality in
education, whether among feminists who ponder the value of single-sex education or
11. For the classic consideration of the geopolitical context of Brown, see Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation
as a Cold War Imperative, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 61 (1988); more recently, see Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil
Rights (Princeton U. Press 2000).
12. The Brown lawyers aspired to integration, Minow argues, but the decision never mandated it; after a
relative brief period of court-order desegregation, recent precedents have found school desegregation plans that
take race into account, even voluntary plans, constitutionally impermissible. See Parents Involved in
Community Schools. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
13. Martha Minow, In Brown's Wake: Legacies of America's Educational Landmark, ch. 3 (Oxford U.
Press 2010).
14. Id. at 68.
15. Under Department of Education rules issued in 2006, it no longer is necessary for administrators to
provide a comparable institution to students of the excluded sex. It is left to recipients of federal funds to assess
whether single-sex schools are necessary to advance an important objective. See U.S. Dept. of Educ., Secretary
Spellings Announces More Choices in Single Sex Education: Amended Regulations Give Communities More
Flexibility to Offer Single Sex Schools and Classes, http://www2.ed.gov/print/
news/pressreleases/2006/10/10242006.html (released Oct. 24, 2006).
2011]
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civil rights advocates who consider the value of school choice. Social science studies
purporting to show educational benefits of various pedagogies that turn on integration or
separation have not painted a clear picture. Figures on all sides of educational
controversies use and misuse studies to justify their versions of school equity. 16
The nation's interest in accountability, demonstrated through a near-obsession with
measuring achievement through standardized testing, also has influenced whether
students of color, children with disabilities, English language learners, and others have
the opportunity to learn alongside middle-class whites. 17 Persistent racial achievement
gaps on testing incentivize white flight from racially diverse schools. African-American
and Hispanic students who attend schools where many students are impoverished suffer
most when middle-class, white families flee from school system, Minow notes. These
students of color are not disadvantaged because white students magically enhance school
quality, she argues. Rather, white middle-class students and families bring to schools
access to social networks and intellectual capital that poor students and families typically
do not posses, at least not at the same rates as the white middle class. 1 8
Paul Frymer's book, Black and Blue: African Americans, the Labor Movement,
and the Decline of the Democratic Party, complements Minow's work by offering an
analysis of intergenerational economic stasis, union decline, and their relationship to
racial hierarchy in society including in the schools. In just over 200 pages, Frymer, a
professor of political science and legal studies who analyzes labor and civil rights from
an institutional perspective, packs a powerful intellectual punch. Unlike some scholars in
recent years, he argues that "poor decisions and unwise tactics of labor leaders and their
followers" do not explain the absence of a strong and racially diverse labor movement. 19
Instead, Congress' bifurcated legislative approach to labor and civil rights issues, along
with ill-conceived institutional structure and design, explain the poor fortunes of workers
in twentieth-century America.
The federal government split questions of race and class when it passed the
Wagner Act in 1935 and the Civil Rights Act in 1964, Frymer explains. According to
Frymer, these two legislative acts, accompanied by two distinct regulatory agencies,
separated the interests of blacks and labor and "institutionalized the race/labor divide."
Civil rights historians have long noted that the Wagner Act permitted racial
discrimination. Frymer emphasizes a downside of civil rights activists' use of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act to challenge systemic discrimination by labor unions. The courts
integrated labor, but in the process, weakened the bargaining power of unions subject to
lawsuits. Meanwhile, white workers fled unions and the Democratic Party. The
Republican Party, fortified by racially aggrieved whites and union members, won
elections and appointed members to the National Labor Relations Board who proceeded
to further weaken the labor movement. Republicans on the EEOC also rolled back civil
rights protections. With that, Frymer offers an "autopsy," as he terms it, of labor, civil
16. Minow, supra n. 12, at ch. 6; see also id at 141-143.
17. Id. at 298-299.
18. Ib. at 393-394.
19. See Paul Frymer, Black and Blue: African Americans, the Labor Movement, and the Decline of the
Democratic Party 2 nn. 5-8 (Princeton U. Press 2007) (citing Risa Lauren Goluboff, Robert Korstad, and
Nelson Lichtenstein).
694 [Vol. 45:691I
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rights, and the Democratic Party.
While Frymer pushes back against scholars who, he asserts, heap blame upon the
NAACP, labor organizations, and the workers themselves for their own misfortunes, he
offers a provocative argument about public interest lawyers' roles in the decline of labor.
He argues that civil rights lawyers' "disinterest" in class-based rights arguments results
in part from their ties to "corporate power." These lawyers represent clients "pro bono,"
but the organizations in question can only do so because they receive financial backing
from corporate firms. Consequently, these lawyers are "unwilling to confront economic
power in any meaningful way."20 Frymer's observations, which are not accompanied by
citations or names of organizations, appear to relate to the post-1964 period and recent
events. He does, however, briefly reference Fortune 500 companies' backing of civil
rights lawyers' strategies in the University of Michigan affirmative action cases as an
example of this phenomenon. Frymer's analysis is sobering. It calls to mind earlier
claims about conflicts of interest between civil rights and clients. 21
More of an effort ought to have been made to substantiate such a bold claim. The
example he breezily references is likely off the mark. The entity that Fortune 500
Companies supported in the University of Michigan cases was the university itself, a
client represented by a private law firm.22 The university did not stand in for, or claim to
represent, the interests of minority or working-class communities in the manner that the
"civil rights" or "public interest" bar did.23 In fact, as Justice Clarence Thomas noted in
his dissent in the law school case,24 the law school's admissions criteria actually
disadvantage minority and working class applicants; some commentators agreed.25 On
this account, the Fortune 500 companies and the law schools' defense of affirmative
action averted a discussion of the systemic inequalities at the root of the American
educational system. In the University of Michigan cases, the conflict of interest analysis
was not as straightforward as Frymer suggests.
Nevertheless, Frymer's general point is very well taken: the prospect of corporate
capture potentially imperils the public interest bar.26 But capitalists are not the only
culprits here. Freymer is not keen to admit it, but the public interest bar and activists
20. Id. at 7.
21. See Derrick A. Bell Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L.J. 470 (1976); see also Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Race as Identity
Caricature: A Local Legal History Lesson in the Salience of Intraracial Conflict, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1913
(2003).
22. Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105
Colum. L. Rev. 1436, 1463 (2005).
23. Id. at 1467.
24. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349-378 (2003). For an analysis of Thomas's opinion that
elaborates on this point, see Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The Transformative Racial Politics ofJustice Thomas?: the
Grutter v. Bollinger Opinion, 7 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 787 (2005).
25. Brown-Nagin, supra n. 20, at 1436; see also Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Comment:
Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 113
(2003); Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative
Action, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 928 (2001).
26. The more recent discussion of corporate power potentially undermining public service related not to
civil rights lawyers but to the Congressional Black Caucus. See Eric Lipton & Eric Lichtblau, In Black Caucus,
a Fund Raising Powerhouse, N.Y. Times Al (Feb. 13, 2010); but see Marin Cogin, Congressional Black
Caucus Rips New York Times Piece, Politico, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0210/33142.html (posted
Feb. 18, 2010, 3:08 p.m. EST).
201l1]
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themselves always have made hard strategic and tactical choices ones subject to
question on grounds that they did not serve the best interest of their clients. Future
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis known as the "people's lawyer" deployed
stereotypes about women's capabilities in order to win protective labor legislation for
women, and he eventually, he hoped, for the labor movement. His strategy succeeded in
Muller v. Oregon, in which the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a ten-hour workday for
women.27 Brandeis' advocacy helped to lay the foundation for the labor movement's
demands for special protections on the job for all workers. 28 At the time, some women's
leaders questioned the wisdom of Brandeis's Muller strategy because it further
embedded the notion of women's difference into constitutional law, in particular, those
based on women's childbearing and childrearing capacities. 29 The concept of women as
the "second sex" has been difficult to expunge from culture, and even from the law, 30
and some still contend that Brandeis' Muller strategy aided the resistance. Moreover, to
this day, feminists argue about the wisdom of women pursing special rights or
accommodations in the workplace. 31 Such examples-when lawyers for political
movements make bold and controversial decisions that potentially damage their clients'
interests-span groups and periods. If we limit ourselves to the twentieth century alone,
the women's, civil rights, and antipoverty movements illustrate the phenomenon. We
need to embrace these fraught moments in the history of public interest lawyering, where
advocates encountered difficulties in interactions with their own clients, not to mention
the courts and legislators. They are teachable moments for scholars who study how
advocates use the law to seek change, and for change agents themselves.
Julie Novkov's book, Racial Union: Law, Intimacy, and the White State in
Alabama, 1865-1954, tackles different subject matter from the other two selections, and
adds a distinct dimension to the study of law, politics, and racial hierarchy. Novkov, a
political scientist, studies the "political development . of racial orders" and the
"institutionalization of white supremacy" at the state level.32 She considers Alabama's
criminalization of interracial marriage and corresponding court battles to enforce and
overturn bans against "miscegenation" in order to explain how the law "embeds" cultural
and racial subordination. Novkov's abstract rhetorical frameworks, including references
to "racial formation," "racial orders," and "culturally constructed elements of
hierarchies" in the political development of states, will be familiar to specialists, if not to
27. 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding statute limiting woman's workday in factories to ten hours per day on
grounds of women's inferior physical capabilities and childbearing and childrearing functions).
28. Melvin Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis: A Life ch. 9 (2009).
29. See e.g. Monica Diggs Mange, The Formal Equality Theory in Practice: The Inability of Current
Antidiscrimination Law to Protect Conventional and Unconventional Persons, 16 Colum. J. Gender & L. 1, 26-
28 (2007).
30. Id. The most obvious example of a law that accommodates women's difference in the way that some
find problematic is The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982) (providing that
employment discrimination on the basis of "pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions is sex
discrimination for purposes of that Act.").
31. See Wendy Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment
Debate, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 325, 354 n.1 14 (1984-85);.
Mary F. Radford, Wimberly and Beyond: Analyzing the Refusal to Award Unemployment Compensation to
Women Who Terminate Prior Employment Due to Pregnancy, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 532, 606-608 (1988).
32. Julie Novkov, Racial Union: Law, Intimacy, and the White State in Alabama, 1865-1954 5 (U. Mich.
Press 2008). Novkov's approach borrows from the theory of Desmond King and Rogers Smith. Id. at 5-6.
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a wider audience. 33
The most noticeable and welcome feature of Novkov's work is how well it
captures dynamism in the law. Burns v. State,34 an 1872 decision, provides the jumping
off point for Novkov's discussion of state building through the regulation of interracial
intimacy. In Burns, the Supreme Court of Alabama overturned state legislation
criminalizing interracial marriage on grounds that it violated federal law (the Civil
Rights Act of 1866).35 From that point forward, however, the state contested the
decision, including in its 1901 constitution. The constitution, organized around the
principle of white racial purity, forbade the legislature to permit interracial marriage, as it
threatened the white racial order. The state regulated miscegenation on grounds that
marriage, or more particularly, the families that constituted them, were fundamental
elements of the public order. Alabama jurisprudence developed in ways that defined and
rationalized the white family as the primary organ of the state. The idea of an interracial
family was a "logical and legal" contradiction in terms, according to Novkov.36
The state punished miscegenation with two-to-seven year sentences in the state
penitentiary, giving rise to the mountain of cases that comprise Novkov's study. Her
impressive database consists of all reported miscegenation cases in Alabama from 1865
to 1970. (The U.S. Supreme Court's 1967 decision in Loving v. Virginia finally felled
criminal prosecutions of miscegenation in Alabama and elsewhere). 37 Among other
things, Novkov's discussion informs us that litigation over interracial sex bans often
turned on questions of racial integrity; it reinforced a binary racial order, one into which
"mulattoes" and Native Americans did not easily fit.38 Defendants could argue that no
offensive sex had occurred because the accused had not mated across racial boundaries; a
defendant could claim a defense of whiteness, that is.39 It comes as no surprise that
relationships between black men and white women dominated the law reports; the state
placed few burdens on white male access to black women.
Novkov hopes to offer lessons about race, gender, law, and the state, and a
nuanced discussion of on-the-ground developments related to interracial intimacy
emerges in her work. She is convincing on the point that projects like hers, focused on
the state as opposed to the national level, have much to tell us. That said, most would not
argue with the proposition that state actors in post-bellum Alabama embraced white
supremacy. Novkov's case-by-case survey of anti-miscegenation litigation in the state
after 1865 shows us the stages of the process. As important as her contribution is,
Novkov's work could have been bolder. I wondered about the relative utility of bans
against interracial intimacy to the institutionalization of white supremacy, as compared
to peonage, disfranchisement, or Klan violence, for instance. Novkov's work might have
33. Id. at 5-6, 12-13.
34. 48 Ala. 195, 198-199 (Ala. 1872).
35. Id.
36. Novkov, supra n. 30, at 16, 44-48, 53-54.
37. Id. at 271-275, 282.
38. Id. at 108-147; cf Ariela Gross, What Blood Won't Tell: A History of Race on Trial in America
(Harvard U. Press 2010).
39. Defendants asserted "property in whiteness." See Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 Harv. L.
Rev. 1707 (1993); see also Novkov, supra n. 30, at 118-119.
2011]
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benefited from considering just how crucial bans against interracial intimacy were to
white supremacy.40
Novkov concludes by speculating about whether her study of bans against
interracial marriage can enlighten contemporary discussions about same-sex marriage.
While this discussion surely will distract readers who might prefer to draw their own
conclusions from her careful analysis, Novkov, a political scientist, could hardly resist
the pull to explore this live controversy.
All three works echo one point that Novkov makes in this discussion. Opponents
of same sex marriage uniformly disclaim animus as a basis for their position, and courts
that rule against recognition of same-sex marriage see the existing order as "pre-
political" or "natural." Each author emphasizes how certain inequities in schools, in the
economy, or in state construction of marriage and family relationships - are naturalized.
Yet, the losers in the natural order are the "perennial losers," 4 1 subjects of discrimination
and stigma historically and presently.
II
All of these authors bid readers to engage with inequality - not only because it is
the just thing to do but also because stratification costs all of us. A single sentence in
Novkov's book beautifully captures the idea. She writes: "Forgetting or refusing to
remember, blinding ourselves to color, has consequences."42 Minow makes the thought
more concrete. She claims that we all lose when society is balkanized; social integration
is important to employers and to a well-functioning democracy. By changing how we
talk about Brown's legacy - insisting that something was in it for virtually all of us rather
than only for a narrow interest group Minow hopes to reinvigorate the ideal of
community despite differences. 43
Increasingly, however, social scientists emphasize the costs of diversity.
Commentators claim that social cohesiveness decreases in diverse neighborhoods and
schools.44 Some question whether diversity increases productivity in the workplace. 45
40. Novkov mentions these other tools of white supremacist orders in passing. See Novkov, supra n. 30, at
8.
41. U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
42. Novkov, supra n. 30, at 2.
43. Minow, supra n. 12, at 393, 396, 403-407. This discussion has been a theme of Minow's work. See
Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law (Cornell U. Press 1991).
44. See e.g. Robert D. Putnam, E. Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century,
30 Scandinavian Pol. Stud. 137 (2007); Lisa Delpit, Other People's Children: Cultural Conflict in the
Classroom (New Press 1996).
45. See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost Benefit Analysis of the Business
Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 Wisc. L. Rev. 795, 827, 841-853 (2005) ("[u]nless the
effects of diversity are well managed, miscommunication, and interpersonal conflict may increase leading to
lower productivity and ultimately lower performance on profit") (quoting Taylor Cox, Jr. & Carol Smolinski,
U.S. Dept. Labor Glass Ceiling Commn., Managing Diversity and Glass Ceiling Initiatives as National
Economic Imperatives (U.S. Dept. of Labor 1994) (available at
http://digitalcommons.ilr.comell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=11 19&context-key workplace)); David
Orentlicher, Diversity: A Fundamental American Principle, 70 Mo. L. Rev. 777, 799-800 n.120 (2005) ("To be
sure, the limited empirical evidence that is available paints a mixed picture about the value of diversity in the
workplaces"); Briana L. Seagriff, Keep Your Lunch Money: Alleviating Workplace Bullying with Mediation, 25
Ohio St. J. on Dis. Res. 575, 578-580 (2010) ("As organizations reorganize and scout for collaborative leaders
to manage diversity and work teams become more diverse, conflict increasess"); Amy L. Wax, Discrimination
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These negative analyses and outlooks on social integration merit closer consideration.
Frymer's institutional analysis of inequality directly confronts these negative sentiments
about diversity. Whereas equal protection jurisprudence and public commentators
discuss inequality in terms of individual bad motive - we ask, is he a racist? - 46 Frymer
insists that readers focus on the idea that behaviors that create inequality racism, in
particular - are not irrational. Rather, such practices are strategic; they facilitate access to
or help maintain power, wealth, and prestige in institutions.4 7
Either way, the question we might ask ourselves going forward is how we can
promote institutional configurations that encourage people who otherwise are
competitors for scarce resources to invest in integration. In what ways can whites learn to
see that their fates are tied to that of people of color, and vice versa? Minow's book
mediates on this matter the most, yet she devotes less time discussing common
understandings of equality that each slice of the larger community might invoke
productively. 48
As I see it, four models emerge, and each has something to commend it, along with
serious limitations. One approach is to place an emphasis on "universal," as opposed to
targeted programs, such as race-specific programs, that have the potential to advance the
interests of all. This, as President Obama has written, "isn't just good policy; it's also
good politics." 49 Proponents of this approach advocate priorities such as universal health
care, child-tax credits, living wages, charter schools, and other forms of school choice.
Immediately obvious is the fact that so-called universalism does not avoid the
contentiousness associated with targeted programs. The policy arguments are a shade
different, but no less contentious or partisan.
A second and related approach emphasizes the building and fortifying of multi-
racial organizations and coalitions. Frymer notes that notwithstanding the decline of the
labor movement, one third of it is represented by people of color, and there are more
people of color in labor organizations than in any civil rights organization. 50 These are
eye-opening facts. Nevertheless, organizations and coalitions, even diverse ones, in and
of themselves, are not politically meaningful. Organizations must employ goals and
processes that can achieve just results. This approach can only be an initial step, prior to
negotiation and combat with external political actors.
Third, some advocate discursive and educative practices and strategic alliances
within institutions to promote institutional restructuring51 and "racial literacy."52 For
as Accident, 74 Ind. L.J. 1129, 1185 n.164 (1999) ("There simply is 'no systematic proof that diversity
management programs decrease ethnic and gender tensions while increasing profits, productivity, and
creativity."').
46. Washington D.C. v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Charles Lawrence, The Id the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 (1987); cf Richard Thompson Ford,
The Race Card: How Bluffing about Bias Makes Race Relations Worse (Picador 2009).
47. Frymer, supra n. 18, at 108.
48. Frymer is confident that "almost anyone can be induced to follow orders or change his or her behavior
in a specific institutional context, whether through simple peer pressure or an effort to follow structured rules."
Frymer, supra n. 18, at 127.
49. Barack Obama, The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream 247 (Crown
Publishers 2006).
50. Frymer, supra n. 18, at 1-2.
51. See e.g. Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative
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example, school administrators must create "cultures of achievement" for low-income,
minority children and workplace managers must actively recruit diverse workers - across
color, gender, language, and disability barriers - and show that they value their presence
once they are in the workplace. These practices presuppose that people are willing to
compromise across boundaries and learn, and they may well be; however, proponents
must develop incentives that encourage institutional stakeholders to overcome self-
interested behavior that underlies stratification.
Fourth, some emphasize approaches that seek to break down boundaries through
social, cultural, and interpersonal exchange across lines of race, class, gender, and the
like. Long-term, these methods might be most effective. But they may be the least
susceptible to outside influence or manipulation. Consider, for example, that some
commentators have suggested interracial marriage is the surest approach to ameliorating
racial conflict in America. 53 This proposal might be correct, but no one would suggest
that the state should promote interracial unions. 54 Or, take the less extreme example:
interracial friendships, many of which begin in neighborhoods and schools.
Neighborhoods are segregated. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that school districts
cannot even voluntarily adopt school integration plans that might promote cross-racial
exchange among school children. 55 Increasingly, individuals themselves must initiate
cross-boundary exchanges. That observation takes us back to the law, however, for all
such exchanges take place within its shadow.
III
The courts' competence to address inequality roots each book's discussion. Each
work, in its own way, permits us to question scholarly narratives that emphasize judicial
incompetence and counsel judicial restraint. The authors do not, in the main, tell tales of
judicial heroism. One does not necessarily come away from these readings less
pessimistic about the courts. But the combination of methodological approaches
employed by these authors makes clear the variety of roles that courts can play in
movements for political and social movements for equality. 56
Minow's analysis of Brown's legacy emphasized breadth. For Minow, Brown has
endured in hundreds of different ways, even as the U.S. Supreme Court itself has chipped
away at the case's central premise as applied in the context of racial desegregation.
Minow's work maps the variety of stakeholders responsible for implementing Brown's
Deal, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 953, 959 (1996) (discussing the need for a new paradigms for recruitment, selection, and
promotion in order to enhance diversity); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: a
Structural Approach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 458 (2001) (suggesting a structural regulatory solution to the
problem of second generation discrimination).
52. Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, The Miner's Canary: Enlisting Race, Resisting Power, Transforming
Democracy (Harvard U. Press 2003).
53. See Michael Lind, The Next American Nation: The New Nationalism and the Fourth American
Revolution 288-298 (Simon & Schuster 1996).
54. Latest figures show that the number of interracial marriages has declined; some argue that economic
distress is a factor in peoples' willingness to engage in exogenous marriage. Cf Sam Roberts, Black Women
See FewerBlack Men at the Altar, N.Y. Times A12 (June 4,2010).
55. Parents Involved in Community Schools, 551 U.S. 701.
56. This perspective also expresses some of the themes that I explore in my own forthcoming work.
Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Courage to Dissent (Oxford U. Press forthcoming 2011).
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norm of equality over time. Notably, many of those people are legislators and other
public officials; these individuals work with courts and with awareness of judicial
decisions, not autonomously. This is true even when political rhetoric suggests
otherwise, as some of the school finance cases show; legislators claim to disfavor court
mandates, but over time, school funding levels rise. 57 Most recently, Brown has given
rise to varieties of school choice; legal rules or standards established by courts long ago,
or even present courts, may yet play a large role in determining which students get
access to this programming.
Frymer's analysis emphasized depth in several institutional contexts. Far from
discussing judicial incompetence, Frymer portrays the federal courts as "powerful and
successful."58 Judges achieved their objectives of integrating labor unions; for Frymer,
the second-order problems that occurred in the labor movement as a result of Title VII
litigation did not undermine the fact of judicial success. Frymer's analysis also reminds
us to consider all of the institutions in which lawmaking occurs, courts, Congress, as well
as regulatory agencies. Again, courts are not autonomous, but interactive.
Novkov offers an in-depth analysis of a single subject matter and state. Even as she
concerns herself with how courts and law embed racism and inequality, Novkov stresses
"openness in doctrinal development when legal institutions interact with social forces." 59
In her telling, the system is "porous" to culture, political developments, and legal
argument.60 Moreover, she does tell a story of judicial success. Loving v. Virginia
effected fundamental social change. To be sure, timing was an important element of the
decision's success, and enforcement was largely left to individuals rather than to state
actors. Nonetheless, Loving doubtlessly represents a form of judicial success.61
CONCLUSION
Taken together, these three books, one from a law professor and two from political
scientists, remind us that the analyses we offer about the law depend on our lens and our
methodologies. It remains to be seen, however, whether public discourse about the work
of the courts will ever become as nuanced as some of the scholarship. For now, it is
fashionable to criticize "judicial activism" and praise 'judicial restraint,"
notwithstanding the fact that these terms are easily manipulated. Meanwhile, judges are
human; they operate in the real and dynamic world of modem constitutional law and
they do not unerringly apply the same jurisprudential tools to each and every like case.
Elected officials beacon the courts to strike down or rewrite statutes through faulty
drafting, failure to address matters such as entrenched inequality, or by writing their
prejudices and the preferences of special interests - including corporations - into the law.
57. See James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 Yale L.J. 249 (1999).
58. Frymer, supra n. 18, at 129.
59. Novkov, supra n. 30, at 20.
60. Id.
61. See John DeWitt Gregory & Joanna L. Grossman, The Legacy of Loving, 51 How. L.J. 15, 18 (2007)
(noting that "Loving is understood by most to be a 'landmark' case."); Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Jacob
Willig-Onwuachi, A House Divided: The Invisibility of the Multiracial Family, 44 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ Libs.
L. Rev. 231, 237 (stating "the Loving decision has consistently been highlighted as a transformative case on
race relations and a symbol of the steady breakdown of racial barriers in intimate and personal relationships.").
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The vaunted "democratic process" lays the most controversial issues at the court's feet.
I wonder what would happen if the American people had a more accurate picture
of the courts and more realistic about the capacity of elected officials to address our
thorniest social problems? Perhaps next on our agenda should be nuanced works about
courts, politics, and inequality, like Minow, Frymer, and Navkov's - but written for a
general audience. Such accessible and nuanced works might help to inspire the fresh
rhetorical frames and public conversations about law and society that we need, for a
change.
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